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The Button That Broke the Internet (and Built It Too) 20:02

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Let's Know Things

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A calm, non-shouty, non-polemical, weekly news analysis podcast for folks of all stripes and leanings who want to know more about what's happening in the world around them. Hosted by analytic journalist Colin Wright since 2016.
letsknowthings.substack.com

645 episodes

#Politics #News Talk #Analysis #Colin Wright #Current Affairs #News #Commentary #Technology #Weekly

Let's Know Things

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updated il y a environ 24 heures

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645 episodes

#Politics #News Talk #Analysis #Colin Wright #Current Affairs #News #Commentary #Technology #Weekly

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1
Circular Finance 16:02

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This week we talk about entanglements, monopolies, and illusory money. We also discuss electrification, LLMs, and data centers. Recommended Book: The Extinction of Experience by Christine Rosen Transcript One of the big claims about artificial intelligence technologies, including but not limited to LLM-based generative AI tech, like ChatGPT, Claude, and Gemini, is that they will serve as universal amplifiers. Electricity is another universal amplifier, in that electrifying systems allows you to get a lot more from pretty much every single thing you do, while also allowing for the creation of entirely new systems. Cooking things in the kitchen? Much easier with electricity. Producing things on an assembly line? The introduction of electricity allows you to introduce all sorts of robotics, measuring tools, and safety measures that would not have otherwise been available, and all of these things make the entire process safer, cheaper, and a heck of a lot more effective and efficient. The prime argument behind many sky-high AI company valuations, then, is that if these things evolve in the way they could evolve, becoming increasingly capable and versatile and cheap, cooking could become even easier, manufacturing could become still faster, cheaper, and safer, and every other aspect of society and the economy would see similar gains. If you’re the people making AI, if you own these tools, or a share of the income derived from them, that’s a potentially huge pot of money: a big return on your investment. People make fortunes off far more focused, less-impactful companies and technologies all the time, and being able to create the next big thing in not just one space, but every space? Every aspect of everything, potentially? That’s like owning a share of electricity, and making money every time anyone uses electricity for anything. Through that lens, the big boom in both use of and investment in AI technologies maybe shouldn’t be so surprising. This represents a potentially generational sea-change in how everything works, what the economy looks like, maybe even how governments are run, militaries fight, and so on. If you can throw money into the mix, why wouldn’t you? And if that’s the case, the billions upon billions of dollars sloshing around in this corner of the tech world make a lot of sense; it may be curious that there’s not even more money being invested. Belief in that promise is not universal, however. A lot of people see these technologies not as the next electricity, but maybe the next smartphone, or perhaps the next SUV. Smartphones changed a whole lot about society too, but they’re hardly the same groundbreaking, omni-powerful upgrade that electricity represents. SUVs, too, flogged sales for flailing car companies, boosting their revenues at a moment in which they desperately needed to sell more vehicles to survive. But they were just another, more popular model of what already came before. There’s a chance AI will be similar to that: better software than came before, for some people’s use-cases—but not revolutionary, not groundbreaking even on the scale of pocketable phone-computers. What I’d like to talk about today are the peculiar economics that seem to be playing a role in the AI boom, and why many analysts and financial experts are eyeballing these economics warily, worrying about what they maybe represent, and possibly portend. — The term ‘exuberance,’ in the context of markets, refers to an excitement among investors—sometimes professional investors, sometimes casual investors, sometimes both—about a particular company, technology, or financial product type. The surge in interest and investment in cryptoassets during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, for instance, including offshoot products like NFTs, was seemingly caused by a period of exuberance, sparked by the novelty of the product, the riches a few lucky insiders made off these products, and the desire by many people—pros and consumer-grade investors—to get in on that action, at a moment in which there wasn’t as much to do in the world as usual. Likewise, the gobs of money plowed into early internet companies, and the money thrown at companies laying fiberoptic cable for the presumed boom in internet customers, were, in retrospect, at least partly the consequence of irrational exuberance. In some cases these investors were just too early, as was the case with those cable-laying companies—the majority of them going out of business after blowing through a spectacular amount of money in a short period of time, and not finding enough paying customers to fund all that expansion—in others it was the result of sky-high valuations that were based on little beyond the exuberance of investors who probably should have known better, but who couldn’t get past their fear of missing out on the next big thing. In that latter case, that flow of money into early dotcom startups did fund a few winners that survived the eventual bursting of that bubble, but the majority of companies tagged with those massive valuations went out of business in part because their valuations were based in part on optimism, hot air, and illusory financials. Which is to say, their financials were based on a lot of money being added to their account sheets and tallied in the places investors would see those numbers, but the numbers didn’t mean what most people thought they meant. A company could receive tens of millions of dollars in orders, for instance, but that money and those orders might never be received and fulfilled, or that money might be mostly illusory: maybe it was borrowed from another company to spend on advertising, and that money would then go right back out the door, to the company from which it was borrowed, to pay for their ad services. That kind of arrangement could be beneficial, as the company doing the borrowing might give up a relatively small number of shares in exchange for money, which looks good on its balance sheet, especially if the money is given at a high valuation, even if that money was mostly just a loan from a company providing ad services, with the full knowledge that money would then be spent on their own ad services. And the ad company giving the money could usually afford to buy in at a high valuation, because it knows it will get that money right back, and when it does, it will get to record that money as income on its own balance sheets. So Company A gets millions of dollars from Company B, that money is then paid to Company B for some type of service, and both companies get to record favorable figures on their accounting sheets, as if real sales took place and real outside money changed hands, despite it being a circular move, with very little or no actual value being created. These sorts of relationships are also often good for investors in companies that do this sort of thing, because it makes their investments, the companies they’ve bought into, look even more valuable. Check it out, Company A, which I own shares in, is worth more than it was last month because of all the business it’s conducting, and because this other company bought into it at a higher price per share than I paid! Even though that increase in valuation is predicated on circular financing, the numbers still go up, and they go up for everyone involved, so there’s little reason to crack down on this not illegal, but shady behavior, and even less reason to want anyone else to know about it, because then they might not add their own money to the circular money-cycling, number-increasing machine. The major concern amongst some analysts right now is that the AI boom, especially in the United States, might be essentially this kind of circular cycle, but much larger than previous versions of the same. In the US right now, investment in AI infrastructure like data centers accounts for a huge portion of overall growth—the numbers vary, depending on who you ask and what numbers they look at, but some say that about 90% of total US economic growth, and around 80% of US stock market growth, are predicated on these sorts of investments this past year. Without these investments, the US economy would be basically flat, or worse, and the US stock market would be flailing as well. This situation isn’t ideal whatever the specifics, as too much reliance on just one industry, or one small collection of industries dominated by just a handful of companies and their investors, makes for a precarious financial foundation. If anything goes wrong with just one company, the whole house of cards could collapse. And if anything goes wrong with the industry, things could get even worse, and fast. All that investment, all that construction, all those employees and all that money sloshing around could disappear, could stop being spent, could make all those numbers fall and fall and fall more or less overnight. If this industry is in fact in a bubble, and if it’s being propped up by this kind of circular financing, where companies are fluffing up their own and each other’s accounting books by rotating the same bundle of money and on-paper money from company to company to company, that would portend pretty bad things for the US economy and market, if anyone involved stumbles, even just a little. This is why recent deals between the biggest players in this space are raising so many eyebrows, and causing so much sweat to bead on so many foreheads. In September of 2025, ChatGPT-maker OpenAI announced it had formalized a $100 billion investment deal with AI chipmaker Nvidia, the latter expanding on its existing investment in the former. In October, OpenAI announced it was purchasing billions of dollars worth of AI hardware from Nvidia-rival AMD, and that it’s taking a 10% stake in the company. Microsoft is already heavily invested in OpenAI, to the tune of $13 billion; it takes 49% of OpenAI’s profits, and gets more than that until its original investment is paid back. Microsoft also accounted for nearly 20% of Nvidia’s annualized revenue, as of the fourth quarter of 2025. Oracle, another computing company which has become hugely influential in this space due to its investment in cloud-based AI datacenters, has a $300 billion deal with OpenAI for future infrastructure buildouts and access, and OpenAI’s Stargate datacenter project was co-funded by Oracle and SoftBank. Nvidia also owns part of CoreWeave, which is an AI infrastructure supplier for OpenAI, and which has Microsoft as a massively important customer. All of which is very…tangly. It’s an interconnected mess, and OpenAI and Nvidia are at the center of it, but there are a lot of weak spots, threads that, if pulled, would cause the whole thing to unravel. Which is why this feels like such a dangerous setup to many analysts right now. Consider that in 2025 alone, OpenAI has made around $1 trillion-worth of AI deals. A lot of these deals are plans to invest: commitments to buy data center construction or the use of data center bandwidth, or they’re financial ties with competitors, clients, and providers—companies that would otherwise be competing with, selling to, and buying from each other, rather than linking arms and creating financial and infrastructural interdependencies. Many of these deals are predicated on debt and what are generally considered to be over-inflated IPO valuations, too: money that isn’t money in the traditional, accounting-book sense, in other words. Numbers that make activity, use, and income for these companies look a lot bigger than they concretely are, on balance sheets, which in turn helps their investment numbers go up up up. This dynamic has become overt enough that many of the biggest investors in AI companies, and the heads of said companies, like Sam Altman of OpenAI, have said, outright, that it’s probably a bubble, and that a lot of companies will probably go under in the relatively near future. No one knows when, but it’s a good thing, they’re fond of saying, because that shakeout will kill off the deadweight, allow the survivors to scoop up their former competitors’ assets at fire sale prices, and the whole industry will be further centralized around just a handful of the best and the most impactful, just like in the post-dotcom years. Monopolies and mini-monopolies, which, for the people creating and profiting from those monopolies, at least, seems like a good thing. That optimism glosses over what those in-between years look like, though, especially for smaller investors, employees who are laid off, en masse, and the folks who aren’t profiting directly from the surviving business entities, and who see their stock portfolios collapse and overall growth in their country decrease. Most of the stories in the tech world right now in some way tie back to the promise and concerns surrounding AI. It’s become such a big story because there’s a chance it will be the next electricity, but there’s also a chance the warning signs we’re seeing are real, and things will get a lot worse before they maybe, possibly, for some people, at some point, get better. Show Notes https://finance.yahoo.com/news/a-20-billion-clock-is-ticking-for-openai-as-microsoft-talks-turn-fractious-130006071.html https://www.sfgate.com/tech/article/circular-deals-bay-area-tech-21089538.php https://www.theguardian.com/business/2025/oct/08/openai-multibillion-dollar-deals-exuberance-circular-nvidia-amd https://www.ft.com/content/950e3a36-7141-4426-b7c5-08fad5d83919 https://finance.yahoo.com/news/very-troubling-ais-self-investment-spree-sets-off-bubble-alarms-on-wall-street-160524518.html https://www.cnbc.com/2025/10/15/a-guide-to-1-trillion-worth-of-ai-deals-between-openai-nvidia.html https://insights.som.yale.edu/insights/this-is-how-the-ai-bubble-bursts https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cz69qy760weo https://www.nbcnews.com/business/economy/openai-nvidia-amd-deals-risks-rcna234806 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-10-08/the-circular-openai-nvidia-and-amd-deals-raising-fears-of-a-new-tech-bubble https://flowingdata.com/2025/10/13/circular-deals-among-ai-companies/ https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/07/business/dealbook/openai-nvidia-amd-investments-circular.html https://sherwood.news/markets/analyst-a-lot-more-disclosure-needed-on-these-circular-ai-deals/ https://www.barrons.com/articles/nvidia-microsoft-openai-circular-financing-ai-bubble-5d9a4e7c https://www.investopedia.com/wall-street-analysts-ai-bubble-stock-market-11826943 https://www.goldmansachs.com/insights/articles/ai-may-start-to-boost-us-gdp-in-2027 https://finance.yahoo.com/news/most-us-growth-now-rides-213011552.html This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit letsknowthings.substack.com/subscribe…

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Tariff Leverage 15:44

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This week we talk about trade wars, TACO theory, and Chinese imports. We also discuss negotiation, protectionism, and threat spirals. Recommended Book: More Than Words by John Warner Transcript In January of 2018, then first-term US President Trump announced a slew of tariffs and trade barriers against several countries, including Canada, Mexico, and those in the European Union. The most significant of these new barriers and tariffs were enacted against China, though, as Trump had long claimed that China, the US’s most important trade partner by many measures, was taking advantage of the US market; a claim that economists tepidly backed, as while some of the specifics, like those related to intellectual property theft on the part of China, were pretty overt, the Chinese government fairly brazenly gobbling up IP and technology from US companies that do business in the country before hobbling those US interests in China and handing that IP and technology off to their own, China-born copies, claims about a trade deficit were less clear-cut—most of those sorts of claims seemed to be the result of a misunderstanding about how international trade works. That said, Trump had made a protectionist stance part of his platform, so he kicked off his administration by imposing a package of targeted tariffs against specific product categories from China, including things like solar panels and washing machines. Those were followed by more tariffs on steel and aluminum—from a lot of countries, not just China—and this implementation of trade barriers between the US and long-time trade partners, which had mostly enjoyed barrier-free trade up till that point, kicked off a trade war, with the Trump administration announcing, out of nowhere, new tariffs or limitations, and the country on the pointy end of that new declaration announcing their own counter, usually something the US sells to their country, while in the background, both countries tried to negotiate new trade terms on the down-low. There was a lot of tit-for-tatting in those first couple years of the first Trump administration, and they led to a lot of negotiations between the US government and these foreign governments, which in turn led to the lifting of many such barriers, though the weaponization of barriers continued, with the administration, for instance, announcing a tariff on all imports from Mexico until the Mexican government was able to halt all illegal immigration coming into the US; negotiation ended that threat, too, but this early salvo upset a lot of the US’s long-time allies, while also making it clear that Trump intended to open negotiations with these sorts of threats, whenever possible—which had the knock-on effect of everyone taking the threats pretty seriously, as they were often incredibly dangerous to specific industries, while also taking them less seriously because it was obvious they were intended to be a negotiating tactic. When Trump left office, a bunch of international relationships had been scarred by this approach to trade deals, and when Biden replaced him, he dropped most of the new tariffs against long-time allies, but kept most of the China tariffs in place, especially those related to green technologies like electric vehicles and semiconductors, the local-made versions of which were becoming a big focus for the Biden administration. The administration then went on to expand upon those tariffs, against China, in some cases. What I’d like to talk about today is how this approach to trade protectionism and negotiation has ballooned under the second Trump administration, and what a new threat against China by Trump might mean for how the relationship between these two countries evolves, moving forward. — Trump’s second administration opened with an executive order that declared a national emergency, claiming that the Chinese were trafficking drugs, especially synthetic opioids like fentanyl, into the US, and that this allowed criminals to profit from destroying the lives of US citizens. This declaration allowed him to unleash a flurry of tariffs against China, first imposing 10% on all Chinese imports, then increasing that to 20% in March of 2025. China retaliated, imposing tariffs of 15% on mostly US energy products, like coal and natural gas, and on some types of agricultural machines, while also engaging in some legal pressure against US companies, like Google. They followed this up with tariffs against meat and dairy products, and suspended US lumber import rights, and disallowed three US firms from selling soybeans to China. The US reciprocated, and China reciprocated back. There was a period of spiraling broad tariffs and import bans in the mid-2025 between the US and China, which led to an aggregate baseline tariff on Chinese imports of 104%, which was followed with an aggregate Chinese baseline tariff against US goods of 84%. The US then upped theirs to 145%, and China raised theirs to 125%. Again, vital to understanding this spiral is that the Trump administration made pretty clear that they were doing this mostly as a negotiating tactic. There were claims that they could solve the US deficit by raising tariffs so high that the funds from those tariffs would pay off the country’s debt, but that’s generally not considered to be realistic. Instead, the consensus view is that Trump likes to play negotiating hardball, likes to step into negotiations with the upper-hand, being able to say, give me what I want and I’ll reduce the pain you’re experiencing, basically, and this play against China was another attempt to make that kind of advantage stick. China, for its part, seemed like it was done with the posturing at that point, though: it announced, after its retaliatory tariffs reached 125%, that it would simply ignore all further increases on the US government’s side, because the whole thing is just kind of a joke and it’s beneath them to keep playing this game. Not long after that, Trump announced that the tariffs against China would come down substantially, but not to zero; Trump said this was decided after discussions with China, and Chinese officials said they hadn’t been in contact with the Trump administration about any of this—which is something that seems to happen quite a bit with the Trump administration. During this period of spiraling trade barriers, China was able to establish better and more open trade agreements with other nations in Southeast Asia, including South Korea and Japan. China also reduced it US Treasury holdings, reducing its exposure to the US economy at a moment in which the US government was betting big on policy that many economists considered to be ham-handed at best, completely nonsensical, delusional, and harmful at worst. During that spiral, before things cooled off, China also began applying protections on locally sourced and refined rare earths, which are a category of mineral that are vital for modern electronics and things like solar panels, batteries, semiconductors, and electric vehicles. China makes and owns the rights to the vast majority of the current global supply of these materials, mining about 70% of them and controlling about 90% of global processing. And cutting them off, or even truncating their flow, is considered to be a huge strategic threat. The US has been slowly investing in alternative supplies for such things, but many of them are difficult or expensive to produce in the proper volume, and it’ll likely be a decade or more before those alternative sources can be properly exploited, replacing the volume currently imported from China. Back in June, China granted permits to US businesses that would be allowed to import rare earths, but that supply remained tenuous—a bit of a counter to Trump’s ongoing tariff threats that could seemingly arise out of nowhere, messing up everyone’s plans. The Chinese seemed to want to leverage this supply in the same way, and keeping things limited while issuing a few permits meant the flow could kind of continue, but could also be slowed or cut off, again, at a moment’s notice. In early October, the Chinese government announced new curbs on the export of rare earths and related technologies, just three weeks before a scheduled meeting between Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping. These new curbs further limited what could be imported to the US, even if there were intermediary nations involved, and also tightened their grip on anything related to mining, smelting, recycling, and producing products, like powerful magnets, from such materials. It’s worth mentioning here, too, that these sorts of materials are increasingly vital for the production of high-tech military goods. If the US were to lose access to sufficient volumes of them, the US military would have a very hard time making missiles, replacing satellite components, building tanks and drones—it would give China a significant advantage, probably for years, in terms of upgrading and maintaining their military hardware. Despite that, and despite the US government’s claims that it intended to replace Chinese sources of these materials, theoretically limiting Chinese leverage in these upcoming talks, progress in that department has been minimal, so far; about a billion dollars worth of investment in rare earths supply chains were announced over the past year or so, but further investment is considered to be unlikely in the near-future, and it’ll be a while before these investments will pay off, if they ever do. Shortly after that announcement by the Chinese, President Trump threatened to enforce a new 100% tariff on Chinese imports, beginning on November 1, or potentially even sooner, raising tariff levels to just shy of what they were back in April of 2025, at the peak of the US-China trade protectionism threat-spiral. He also said he didn’t see any reason to meet with Xi if they were going to limit rare earths in this way, but later clarified that the meeting hadn’t been cancelled, and said that he set the implementation date for that new threatened tariff rate to Nov 1 because that would give the Chinese the opportunity to back down on their new trade barriers before they chatted. Global markets, which are sometimes a good barometer for how informed folks think these sorts of negotiations will play out, have been relatively calm about all this, though there have been some significant tumbles in the US market, including a recent drop of about 2.7% for the S&P 500, marking the worst day for the US market since April, back when the tariff threats last reached this kind of peak. One stance that’s become popular in trading circles over the past year is the so-called TACO theory, which stands for Trump Always Chickens Out; the idea being that Trump is never really serious about any of these threats, he just likes to talk a big game and then hopes the other side will feel threatened enough to give him what he wants during negotiations—but if they don’t, he steps back from all his big talk and quietly gives in to the other side, especially if they have leverage. Some analysts are assuming that’s what’s happening now, as evidenced by Trump’s own statements about giving China the chance to deescalate—giving them specific instructions for how to let things calm down, rather than making these threats and suggesting they’re permanent, or not giving the other side any rationale for why it’s happening. There’s a chance, though, that there’s some truth to the opposing theory that this is part of a larger plan by the Trump administration to create a new trade war that’s meant to dominate headlines and concerns for a while, maybe as far into the future as next year’s elections, all of which is meant to conceal other efforts by the administration, like the military occupancy of American cities and the administration’s vehement objection to releasing the so-called Epstein files, which allegedly contain many references to Trump and other powerful people within his administration, which in turn would further connect him to a renowned pedophile. The Republican-controlled congress has made a massive effort to keep those files from being released, and Trump has become well-known for saying and doing headline-grabbing things whenever something inconvenient for him starts bubbling up in the news. So while there’s a chance this back-and-forth will end just before those upcoming trade talks, both sides taking their fingers off the trigger, as it were, in order to make a deal, there’s also a chance elements of this will be spun into a larger narrative, a war of sorts meant to dominate headlines and conceal other things that the administration would prefer to keep off the front page. Show Notes https://apnews.com/article/rare-earths-china-united-states-trade-supply-chain-de92222cda02dc85064c697911c6dea7 https://apnews.com/article/tariffs-timeline-trade-war-trump-canada-mexico-china-a9d714eea677488ef9397547d838dbd0 https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3318694/china-cuts-us-treasury-holdings-third-month-amid-trade-war-debt-ceiling-fears https://apnews.com/article/china-us-trump-tariff-threat-trade-talks-cc4bd30c3b1bcf2eb2676bc0e66efba0 https://apnews.com/article/trump-inflation-federal-reserve-powell-88358f4955fd86ef3c86f5e8e089e775 https://apnews.com/article/trump-xi-tariffs-china-ai-642b042b1ebe1d1930eb93bf51943e3f https://apnews.com/article/trump-xi-china-cc47e258cfc6336dfddcc20fa67a3642 https://apnews.com/article/china-earths-exports-trump-dad99d532f858f04d750d0b8c50e5ed6 https://time.com/7292207/us-china-trade-war-trump-tariffs-timeline/ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China%E2%80%93United_States_trade_war https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tariffs_in_the_first_Trump_administration https://www.piie.com/research/piie-charts/2019/us-china-trade-war-tariffs-date-chart https://www.wsj.com/economy/trade/trumps-fresh-tariff-assault-threatens-chinas-fragile-economy-d0b3a00d https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cn828kg8rmzo This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit letsknowthings.substack.com/subscribe…

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